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ABSTRACT

High transaction costs incurred in the licensing of intellectual property create a
pressure on legal principles ranging from the fair use doctrine of copyright law to the
tying doctrine in antitrust law. It appears, with some exceptions, that antitrust law
is imposing excessive restrictions on the licensing of intellectual property. The effect
of these restrictions, combined with the high transaction costs inherent in the
licensing of intellectual property, is to prevent the maximally efficient allocation of IP
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INTRODUCTION

My subject is the challenging issues presented by modern licensing, issues in
which law, economics, finance, business and technology are inextricably intertwined.
My emphasis will be on the law and economics interface, and specifically on the
pressure that the high transaction costs incurred in licensing intellectual property
("IP") exert on legal principles ranging from fair use in copyright law to the tying
doctrine in antitrust law.

I. TRANSACTION COSTS IN THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Licensing-which is to say the granting of permission for another person to use
your property, usually temporarily, as opposed to the sale of the property-is, in the
case of physical property, generally unproblematic. If you rent a car, or lease an
apartment or an airplane, the transaction is usually quite straightforward; in
economic terms, which are the terms in which this article will largely be cast, the
costs of transacting are low relative to the value of the license. Transaction cost must
not be confused with the license fee, or in other words the contract price. The fee is a
measure of the value of the transaction; the transaction cost is the cost of making the
transaction and thus realizing the value. The higher that cost, the less likely the
transaction is to be made.
The licensing situation is different in the case of intellectual property, partly
because of its invisibility, partly because of its ready appropriability and partly
because of its divisibility. To explain: Because most intellectual property lacks a
physical locus (an original painting or sculpture would be an exception), there is often
difficulty in defining, let alone discerning, the boundaries of what exactly is being
transferred in a license of such property. Moreover, because intellectual property is
readily appropriable simply by being copied (in contrast to a rental car, for example,
which can be appropriated only by being stolen), preserving one's property rights
when one licenses intellectual property is often difficult. And because it is divisible
simply by being copied (try dividing a rental car), the same property may be licensed
to a multitude of licensees, creating complex business relations.

*This paper was originally prepared for, and is the revised text of, a speech delivered at the
Licensing Executives Society's ("LES") Licensing Foundation Annual Colloquium and Dinner, which

took place on April 13, 2005 at the Four Seasons Hotel in Chicago, Illinois.
**Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago
Law School.
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A.

CopyrightLieensing

Different types of intellectual property involve different aspects of the licensing
problem. I will give a few examples. In the licensing of a copyright, there is often a
serious problem just of identifying the copyright owner. Unlike the situation with
regard to physical property, a copyright owner is not required to register his title in
order to preserve his property rights. Even though the requirement that copyrights
be registered to be valid has been abolished, there is still a copyright registry, and
there are procedural advantages to registering one's copyrights.
But failure to
register does not work a forfeiture, so that merely failing to find a work listed in the
copyright registry does not assure the would-be copier that the work is in the public
domain. The costs of identifying and negotiating with the owner of a copyright are
not great in absolute terms, but they are great relative to the value of most
copyrighted works, especially older ones-works first published between 1923 and
1977-which, prior to the enactment of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act,1 would have begun to fall into the public domain in 1998 but will now remain
under copyright until the end of 2018 at the earliest and 2072 at the latest 2 (longer, if
Congress extends the term of copyright again). A high ratio of licensing cost to the
value of the license means that copyright licensing costs will often be a formidable
barrier to a value-maximizing transaction.
Another factor in copyright licensing costs is that the scope of copyright
protection is inherently rather vague. For example, the licensor will usually reserve
to himself the right to copyright any derivative works of the licensed work. But if the
licensee creates a new work that resembles to some degree the licensed work, it may
be unclear whether the new work is a derivative work.

B. Patent and Trade-SeeretLicensing
The licensing of patents and trade secrets presents other problems. In the case
of trade secrets, the main problem is that the owner of the secret will find it difficult
to interest potential licensees without revealing elements of the secret in
negotiations; any such revelation may convey enough information to the potential
licensee to enable him, without need for taking out a license, to unravel the entire
secret. This problem can also arise in the copyright setting if the creator of a new
work wants to license the work before it has been completed; attracting a licensee
may require him to communicate noncopyrightable elements of the work during the
license negotiations, such as title, idea and rough sketches of characters. Knowledge
of those elements may enable the potential licensee to create his own copyrighted
work-without need for a license-by largely duplicating but not infringing the
would-be licensor's copyrighted work.
In the case of patents, there is a question whether the licensee shall be
permitted to patent improvements on the licensed patent, which would block the
licensor from practicing the improved form without a license from the
1 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
2 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
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licensee-improver. 3 The license can provide that the improvements belong to the
licensor, but such a provision may retard the process of perfecting the patented
process or product to the detriment of the licensor. And if, as is often the case, the
licensor intends to continue producing the licensed product, the parties must
negotiate terms, such as a minimum resale price, to protect the licensor from losing
his entire product market to a more efficient licensee.

C TrademarkLicensing
My last example concerns trademarks. Because the chief significance of a
4
trademark is as a warrant of uniform quality of the trademarked product or service,
the owner of a trademark cannot simply license its use to other products. 5 He must
monitor the activities of his licensees to make sure that they are maintaining
uniform quality; for if they are not, the trademark may be forfeited in order to protect
consumers against confusion 6-or, in more technical terms, to minimize consumer
search costs.

7

II. MEANS OF REDUCING THE COSTS OF LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The examples in Part I, and others that could be given, show that transaction
cost, which is to say not the value of a product involved in an exchange but the cost of
effectuating the exchange, is a threat to the ability of the market to allocate
intellectual property to those who value it the most. This means that an important
focus of legal reform should be on means of reducing intellectual property transaction
costs, or, equivalently, licensing costs.

A. Implied Licensing
One direction of reform is to expand the scope of implied licensing, that is, of
permission to use intellectual property without having to negotiate permission.
Implied licensing already plays a large role in the intellectual property area; this is
tacit recognition that so frequently the explicit costs of transacting in such property
are quite high. For example, if you want to copy short passages from a copyrighted
work, you can do so without getting the copyright owner's permission. This is the
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). "[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefore infringes the patent." Id. A valid license provides
the authority necessary for the licensee to avoid liability under § 271(a). Carborundum Co. v.
Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
4 Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002).
5 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:48 (4th

ed. 2004). If a trademark owner engages in such a practice, known as "naked licensing," he loses his
right to exclusive use of the mark. Id.
6 Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1989).
7 Ty, 306 F.3d at 510.
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domain of the doctrine of "fair use,"8 which has counterparts in patent and trademark
law, but I will not discuss its patent-law counterpart beyond noting that the right to
patent an improvement of a product or process patented by someone else could be
thought a form of fair use. The counterpart to fair use in trade secret law is the right
to unmask a trade secret by reverse engineering. 9
For the most part, it is only because intellectual property transaction costs are
high that a doctrine such as fair use exists. It would be very odd to think that, as
long as I want to take my neighbor's car for just a short joy ride, I should be able to
do so without asking his permission. While if a licensee wants a contract, the
licensor can (for a price, obviously) impose limitations on the licensee's fair-use right,
just as a patentee can reserve the rights to his (explicit) licensee's patent
improvements, fair use creates a broad area in which-since you can get a license
without negotiating with the copyright owner-licensing costs are reduced to zero.

B. Compulsory Licensing
An alternative to the implicit, cost-free, fair-use type of implied license is the
compulsory license, where, again, the licensee does not have to negotiate with the
licensor, and so licensing costs are zero. The fee that the licensee under a compulsory
license must pay is not meant to defray the licensing costs, in whole or in part, but to
compensate the copyright owner for the value of his property (more precisely, the
value represented by the copyright). The fee thus is the equivalent of the contract
price and is distinct from the transaction costs-the costs of making the contractwhich are still in this example zero. Thus like fair use, compulsory licensing is a
further testament to the perceived significance of intellectual property licensing costs
as a barrier to the efficient allocation of such property.

C. PrivateIntellectualPropertyRights Organizations
Another response to those licensing costs consists of private intellectual property
rights organizations and private intellectual property registries; the former being
illustrated by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP")
and Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI") and the latter by the visual-arts registries-the
Artists Rights Association and the Visual Artists and Galleries Association. These
associations help people who want to reproduce works of visual art to obtain licenses
from the copyright holders. Each organization publishes a list of the artists it
represents, keeps a slide catalogue of its members' works and acts as the artists'
agent in negotiating licenses for reproductions of their art in books, postcards,
merchandise, advertisement, films and so on. Once again, the existence of such

8
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9 See, e.g., Laffv. John 0. Butler Co., 381 N.E.2d 423, 433 (11. App. Ct. 1978). '[A] trade secret
is open to anyone, not bound by a confidential relationship or a contract with the secret's owner, who
can discover the secret through lawful means." Id.
Such "lawful means" include reverse
engineering. Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 730 (7th Cir. 2003).

[4:325 2005]

Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns

organizations testifies to the significance of licensing costs in the IP field, most
dramatically in the case of the musical performing-rights organizations such as
ASCAP. If a radio station had to negotiate separately with the owner of the
copyright on each song that it wanted to play, the aggregate licensing costs for a
program of popular music would be astronomical.
The economizing effect of private registries would be enhanced if, as the
copyright lawyer William Patry and I have proposed,1 0 the copying of old copyrights
(concretely, copyrights still in force only by virtue of the Sonny Bono Act") were
deemed a fair use if the owners of the copyrights had failed to place would-be copiers
on notice, as by registering the affected copyrights in a private registry that such
copiers could consult. This rule would provide a strong impetus for the formation of
such a registry, analogous to the visual-rights registries that I mentioned, with a
consequent reduction in copyright licensing costs.

I1. ANTITRUST CONCERNS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING
The other great issue concerning the licensing of IP besides transaction costs
concerns the restrictions that antitrust law imposes on such licensing. My discussion
shall be limited to only a few topics in this rich field.
The reason antitrust figures more prominently in the licensing of intellectual
than of physical property is that a patent or copyright confers a legal "monopoly" on
the patent or copyright holder. 12 This usage, though common, is unfortunate,
because it confuses an exclusive right with an economic monopoly. 13 I have the
exclusive right to the use of my house, but I am not a monopolist and would not be
even if the house were very valuable. A patent or copyright does carve out an area of
exclusive rights, 14 but whether the rights holder can use his rights to obtain a
monopoly return depends on whether there are good substitutes for his product; if

10 William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutnry Rnform in the Wake of
Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639 (2004).
11 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
12 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190, 224 (2003) (indicating that both patents and
copyrights accord a "limited monopoly" to their respective holders). But see Schenck v. Nortron
Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Not every patent is a monopoly.").
13 Patent holders have the exclusive "right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, or selling the [patented] invention." 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). With some exceptions,
copyright holders have "the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of' six specific activities,
including the reproduction and distribution of the copyrighted work, as well as the preparation of
derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). In contrast, an economic monopoly is the power to obtain
a price persistently in excess of the competitive level. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

501 (2002). The exclusive rights held by a patent or copyright holder may facilitate the obtaining of
an economic monopoly but are not the equivalent of such a monopoly. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs.
Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694
F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
14 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (patent); 17 U.S.C. § 106 ( copyright).
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there are, he will not be able to obtain a monopoly return. 15 And that is the usual
case.
But this has never been adequately understood by the law; hence, the
pervasive restrictions that antitrust law imposes on IP licensing. Nonetheless, the
situation is improving, as we shall see, as courts become more sophisticated in regard
to economics.

A. Patent Tying
I begin with patent tie-in cases, cases in which the patent owner conditions the
use of his patented process or product on the licensee's buying another, unpatented
product from him. One example of such a scenario is the early A.B.Dick case, in
which the patentee of a mimeograph machine required his licensees to agree to buy
the ink they used in the machine from him. 16 The antitrust concern was that by
telling the buyer that he couldn't have the use of the tying product (the patented
product or process) unless he agreed to buy a separate product from the seller as
well, the seller was trying to "lever" or "extend" his monopoly to the market for that
separate product-only extending it in product space rather than in time.1 7 This
reasoning does not make good sense. If the seller tries to charge a monopoly price for
the separate product, the buyer will not be willing to pay as much for the tying
product as he would if the separate product, which he has to buy also, were priced at
a lower rate. The two products are complements: raising the price of one reduces the
demand for the other. Acquiring monopoly power in the tied-product market thus
comes at the expense of losing it in the tying-product market.
Patent tie-ins are adopted (when allowed by the law) not to enable a seller to
"lever" his existing monopoly into acquiring a second monopoly, but for other reasons,
such as to facilitate price discrimination. In Dick, the price that licensees of the
mimeograph machine were willing to pay for its use was probably more or less
proportional to the amount of use they envisaged and so to the amount of ink they
used. Requiring licensees to buy the ink from Dick enabled Dick to vary the effective
price the licensees paid for the machine according to the licensees' elasticity of
demand, as proxied by the amount of ink they consumed. The more the licensees
used the machine, the more value they were getting from it, and so the more they
were willing to pay for it in the absence of a competitively priced, close substitute.
The less the licensees used the machine, the less they would pay, since their
consumption of ink would be less; and so the tie-in would tend to retain low-value
customers while "milking" the high-value ones. Since the law permits price
discrimination (with immaterial exceptions18), there is no reason why it should forbid

15See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003) ("A
patent confers a monopoly in the sense of a right to exclude others from selling the patented product.
But if there are close substitutes for the patented product, the patent 'monopoly' is not a monopoly
in a sense relevant to antitrust law.").
16 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overrued in partby Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
17 Id. at 31.
18
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000) (limiting price discrimination "between different purchasers
of commodities' (emphasis added)); id. § 13a (limiting discrimination among purchasers of similar
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tie-ins and thus force sellers to resort to less efficient means of discrimination-if
they were more efficient, a prohibition would be unnecessary-unless the tie-in has a
sinister purpose, which is the exceptional, not the normal, case. Dick could have
installed a use meter in each of its machines and varied the price for each machine
according to the amount it was used. This would be price discrimination because the
determinant of the price paid would be the value to the user rather than the cost to
Dick, but it would be lawful. It might seem that this scenario would differ from the
tie-in in not affecting the ink industry. But there is no difference. Dick didn't want
to take over the production of ink; it just wanted to reprice the ink to its customers.
The most dubious application of the thinking that informed the early patent
tie-in cases came in the Supreme Court's much later decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co.,
which held that a patent owner may not enforce a contract for the payment of patent
royalties beyond the patent's expiration date. 19 The Court reasoned that by
extracting a promise to continue paying royalties after the patent expired, the
patentee had extended the patent beyond the term fixed in the patent statute and
therefore in violation of the law. 20 That is incorrect. After the patent expires, anyone
can make the patented process or product without being guilty of patent
infringement. 21 As the patent can no longer be used to exclude anybody from such
production, expiration has accomplished what it was supposed to accomplish. 22 If the
licensee agrees to continue paying royalties after the patent expires, the royalty rate
will be lower. The duration of the patent fixes the limit of the patentee's power to
extract royalties; it is a detail whether he extracts them at a higher rate over a
shorter period of time or at a lower rate over a longer period of time. Charging
royalties beyond the term of the patent merely alters the timing of royalty payments,
as would be obvious if a patent-licensing agreement obligating the licensee to pay
royalties for the next one-hundred years went into effect a day before the patent
expired. The royalty rate would be minuscule because of the imminence of the
patent's expiration. And, to repeat, as soon as the patent expired, regardless of the
23
payment terms, competitors would be free to use the patented process or product.
The rule of Brulotte has become particularly anomalous since a 1988
amendment to the patent statute, 24 which provides that
[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement.., shall be..
• deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason
of his having .

.

. conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the

goods or services with respect to "any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge"
associated with the goods or services).
19 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
20
Id. at 31-32.
21 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 224 (2003) ("[W]hen [a] patent expires the
monopoly created by it expires, too, and the right to make the article-including the right to make it
in precisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public.").
22 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974). One of the three purposes of the patent law is to "promote]
disclosure of inventions [in order] to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to
practice the invention once the patent expires." Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262.
23 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 224.
24 Act of Nov. 19, 1988, tit. H, § 201, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000)).
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sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in
another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless . . . the patent
owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented
25
product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
The effect of § 271(d) is to confine the doctrine of the patent tie-in cases to those cases
in which the patentee has real market power, not merely the technical monopoly
(right to exclude) that every patent confers. This is a welcome curtailment of the
doctrine but unfortunately falls short of overruling the Brulotte decision. Section
271(d) places a limit merely on defenses to patent-infringement suits, 26 and a
patentee seeking to enforce an agreement to pay post-expiration royalties cannot be
suing for patent infringement; his patent has expired. 27 Moreover, although the
rationale of Brulotte is the same as that of the discredited tying cases 28-the Court
even said in Brulotte that to "use that leverage [the power conferred by the
monopoly] to project those royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is
analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent" 29-and not a whit
stronger (probably even weaker, since there is only one product), the new statutory
defense is limited to tying, as its language makes clear.
Brulotte does not reflect the Supreme Court's current thinking about
competition and monopoly, but it will continue to bind the lower courts until the
Supreme Court decides to overrule it.

B. Blanket Lieensing of Copyrights
Earlier I mentioned the performing-rights organizations.
In the case of
Broadeast Musie, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc., the Supreme Court
upheld the blanket licenses issued by the music performing-rights organizations
against the charge that such licenses are a per se violation of the antitrust laws
because they eliminate price competition. 30 The blanket license entitles the licensee,
for a flat fee, to play any song in the organization's inventory.3 1 The organization
allocates the receipts among its member composers in proportion to the relative
frequency with which their songs are played. 32 In effect, the organization is an
exclusive sales agency for a group of competitors; by setting the price for the
performing rights of its stable of composers, the organization eliminates price
competition among them.33 But this form of price fixing is unusual in enabling a
transaction-cost savings that exceeds any reasonable estimate of the deadweight and
25 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000).
26 See
27

Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 199-201 (1980).
35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The owner of an expired patent lacks standing to sue for infringement by

any act committed after the patent term. See id. § 281.
28 E.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled in partby Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
29 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
30 441 U.S. 1, 20-25 (1979).
31

Id. at 5.

32 Id
3

See id. at 20-23.
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other possible social costs of the blanket licenses' elimination of price competition, 34
and so it escaped the usual per se condemnation of price-fixing agreements. 35 It is
another example of how concern with the high costs of licensing IP can drive lawand rightly so.

C. End-ProductRoyalties
The BMI case has implications for patent licensing; specifically, for the question
whether a patentee should be permitted to base royalties on the licensees' revenues
from the end product that incorporates the patented input. Let me explain. An
additional economic virtue of the blanket licenses for performing music-besides
economizing on transaction costs-is that they avoid the misallocation of resources
that would occur if some musical compositions, being unique and protected from
competition by copyright, were priced far above marginal cost; for this method of
pricing would create an incentive for potential customers to substitute compositions
that might cost society more per unit of quality to produce or disseminate, and that
would be socially wasteful. An end-product royalty has the same virtue as the
blanket license; the licensee's decision on how much of the patented unit to use
relative to other inputs is not distorted by the unit's being priced above its marginal
cost, because the amount of the royalty is invariant to the quantity of the input used.
The legal objection, which I shall take up shortly in connection with bundling, is
that end-product royalties are the carrot to tying's stick. Because it costs the licensee
nothing to substitute the patented input against the other inputs that he might use
to produce the final product, he is irresistibly induced, once he decides to buy some of
the patented input (the "tying quantity," call it), to buy the rest of those inputs from
the patentee as well (the "tied quantity"). However, as we have seen, tie-ins are
normally innocuous and the same is probably true of end-product royalties as well.
Consider Microsoft's former practice of basing the fee that it charged
manufacturers of PCs for the right to install its Windows operating system on their
computers on the manufacturers' total computer sales. 36 This meant that if a
manufacturer wanted to install Windows on at least some of its computers, the
marginal cost of installing the system on the rest was zero. The effect was almost the
same as if Microsoft had required the manufacturers to install Windows in all the
computers the manufacturers sold-this could be analyzed as a tying arrangement in
which the tying product consists of the number of copies of Windows that the
manufacturers want to install, and the tied product (the product they must take to
get the tying product) consists of the number of copies they would prefer not to
install.
The antitrust objection to Microsoft's practice (which the company under
pressure from the Justice Department agreed in a consent decree to abandon 37) is
See id.
35 Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
36 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 323 (D.D.C. 1995).
37 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV. A. 94-1564, 1995 WL 505998 (D.D.C. Aug. 21,
1995) implementing consent decree on remand from United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
'1
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bound up with the special issue of network externalities. This term refers to the
situation in which the value of a product or service to an individual is greater the
more other people buy it38-the classic example being telephone service, which is
worth more to every subscriber the more subscribers there are.3 9 (Consider the value
of telephone service if there is only a single subscriber; that value is zero.40) Even
before the internet, there were network externalities in computer software because of
the value to the owner of a computer of being able to share files. Microsoft's practice,
by making it costless for a computer manufacturer who already had a Windows
license to install Windows on its computers-since his royalty would be unaffectedwould tend to accelerate the spread of Windows, creating the potential by virtue of
network externalities to give Microsoft an operating-system monopoly whether or not
it had the best operating system.

1. Bundling of IntellectualPropertyRights
Another very interesting, older copyright antitrust case-and one that turns out
to be related both to blanket licenses and to tie-ins-is United States v. Loew'%, Inc.,
in which the Supreme Court invalidated "block booking" in the movie industry as a
form of illegal tying. 41 Block booking refers to the movie studios' practice of charging
distributors a price for a bundle of movies rather than pricing each movie
separately. 42 In other words, the purchase of any movie in the bundle is conditioned
on the purchase of the others; 43 so there is a close analogy to a tie-in. And the
motives are similar. When two products are priced separately, the price of each is
depressed by the buyer who values each one less than the other buyer does; the
bundling eliminates this effect. In technical terms, if A is the low-elasticity
demander of product X, and B the low-elasticity demander of product Y, bundling
enables the seller of the two products to discriminate against A with respect to X and
B with respect to Y while charging them the same price so that arbitrage is
prevented.
The profitability of bundling is greater, the more products that can be bundled.
For this makes it more likely that the package will contain products that consumers
place opposite valuations on, as in our numerical example, where A values X more
than B does, while B values Y more than X does.
As in this example, bundling, like tying, is often, perhaps characteristically, a
method of price discrimination, unless the bundle could not be unbundled without a
substantial cost penalty-imagine selling each component of an automobile, the
carburetor, brakes, radiator, axles, etc., separately to the consumer. But like the
blanket licenses in the music industry, bundling reduces transaction costs and, like
both those licenses and end-product-royalty patent-licensing agreements, it
eliminates monopoly as a factor distorting the choice of goods within the bundle.
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Bundling, like tying, end-product royalty agreements and related contractual
methods, including exclusive dealing and full-requirements contracts, may have
anticompetitive effects in particular settings, but not in general; and so the main
effect of banning tying and bundling would be merely to increase the cost of engaging
in price discrimination. And remember that price discrimination is not in general
unlawful, which means that firms engage in tying or bundling when that is the
cheapest or most effective method of discrimination. To the extent that prohibiting
these practices leads not to a reduction in price discrimination but merely to an
increase in the cost of such discrimination, the prohibition imposes a net social cost.
But again, an exception must be made for the situation in which network
externalities are an important competitive factor. For the bundle, like the blanket
license or the end-product royalty, reduces the customer's incremental cost to zero,
which makes it hard for sellers of a single product to compete. The price of the
bundle includes its components, each one of which is therefore "free" to the customer
in the (crucial) sense that he will not save any money if he rejects the bundle in favor
of a component that is sold, necessarily at a positive price, by a single-product
company. The latter will therefore have trouble gaining a foothold in the market.

